A growing community of long time horizon institutional investors that includes sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, and other beneficiary institutions located in cities outside of the major international financial centers (IFCs), is pushing back against the misaligned incentives and power asymmetries present in the for-profit asset management industry. This expanding group of beneficiary institutions, which we define as frontier investors, is retaking responsibility of the end-to-end management of assets through insourcing and direct investing, which allows them to bypass the markets and service providers in IFCs. This article elucidates this organizational-cum-geographical change, which we call frontier finance. In setting the theoretical context, the article presents a conceptual model of frontier places vis-à-vis the market for global financial services and the market for financial assets at the global scale. This is followed by a presentation of field studies of a significant cross section of large beneficiary institutions from around the world in their attempts to insource asset management. Notwithstanding the significance of change at the level of some individual organizations, there is an insufficient critical mass of organizations at this stage successfully implementing change such that the conventional functional and spatial structure of asset management faces an existential threat, and that the dominance of IFCs in the allocation of global flows of capital is in doubt. This confirms the enduring forces of centralization in global financial markets and the importance of agglomeration economies in the market for financial services.
Introduction
The global financial services industry has been the subject of ongoing criticism in the wake of the 2008-2009 financial crisis (French, Leyshon, and Thrift 2009; Martin 2011) . From social movements like Occupy Wall Street to the economic elites at the World Economic Forum, there is widespread concern that the leading edge of the financial services industry has lost sight of its objective function: to facilitate the efficient allocation of economic resources over space and time under conditions of risk and uncertainty (Christophers 2009 ). Instead, the investment houses of the leading international financial centers (IFCs) too often seem to be working in their own interests, even destroying rather than creating value for clients, shareholders, and the real economy (Folkman et al. 2007; Engelen et al. 2011) . For some, parts of the financial world have become socially dysfunctional (Turner 2010) . At the same time, shorttermism appears pervasive, driven by structural changes such as mark-to-market accounting coupled with cognitive constraints to long-term decision making and herd behavior. Consequently, existential socioeconomic challenges of the contemporary period that are material to the generation of value over the long term, such as demographic aging and climate change, are secondary concerns for many in the financial community, if they are a concern at all (Hawley and Williams 2005, 2007; Hebb 2008 ).
There are, however, two important yet understudied and unmapped developments challenging the global geography of finance and investment. On the one hand, a growing number of large institutional investors with long time horizons are appearing in cities outside of the major IFCs that have little or no history as purveyors of flows of global finance. In large part this is due to the dramatic growth and emergence of sovereign wealth funds (SWF) in places such as Abu Dhabi, Auckland, Beijing, Edmonton, Juneau, Moscow, Oslo, and elsewhere. Indeed, more sovereign funds have been set up in the last decade than in all years prior (Clark, Dixon, and Monk 2013) . On the other hand, a growing community of long time horizon institutional investors, that includes SWFs but also public pension funds, family offices, foundations, and endowments, is pushing back against the misaligned incentives, high fees, poor returns, and short-termism embedded in the for-profit asset management industry, which the financial crisis brought to the fore.
This growing group of long-term beneficiary institutions, which we define as frontier investors, is retaking responsibility of the end-to-end management of their assets by insourcing asset management and reconceptualizing the investment decisionmaking process in order to bypass for-profit service providers and, in some cases, IFCs altogether. In this article, we ask the following question: Does the organizational change of large beneficiary institutions located in places beyond the hinterlands of global financial centers represent a "window of locational opportunity" (Scott and Storper 1986, 15 ; see also, Storper and Walker 1989) to remake the map of the investment management industry and, in turn, undermine the dominance of IFCs in the global economy?
Based on primary research covering SWFs and public pension funds from North America, Europe, the Middle East, Aus-tralasia, and East Asia, our findings suggest that frontier investors are developing creative ways of overcoming their geographic constraints, harnessing network economies where agglomeration economies are not present, and using their locational and organizational attributes in creative ways to fulfill their human resources needs. Like other developments such as Islamic finance (see, e.g., Pollard and Samers 2007, 2011; Bassens, Derudder, and Witlox 2011) , this shift in practice and organizational form has potentially significant implications for the global geography of finance and the allocation of capital across time and space.
Our findings do not, however, suggest the demise of IFCs and the for-profit financial service providers. Financial centers produce a range of agglomeration economies in addition to offering a wide range of complementary services that the frontier investors in our study located in financial outposts cannot (Porteous 1999; Faulconbridge et al. 2007 ). Attracting and retaining talented and specialized labor, and accessing sufficient and attractive deal flows, are easier to achieve in a major urban agglomeration. Hence, at this juncture, there is an insufficient critical mass of organizations that are successfully and efficiently overcoming the organizational and geographical constraints necessary to produce an existential threat to the dominance of the IFCs and the forprofit service providers. If frontier finance, the term we give to this organizational-cumgeographical change, represents a window of locational opportunity, it is in its infancy. Yet, even if frontier finance is unable to unseat the dominance of IFCs, it may over time come to represent a viable (if small in comparison) parallel decentralized system of global finance that provides a better alignment between the owners and users of capital, as the rents that would normally acrue to intermediaries and other market participants (e.g. short-term speculators) are removed (Klagge and Martin 2005) . This claim is, however, speculative.
While providing further insight into large beneficiary institutions, the article's primary contribution is to the geographical literature on the structure and scope of financial markets and the financial services industry from the local to the global (see e.g., Cook et al. 2007; Clark 2008; Engelen and Grote 2009; O'Brien and Keith 2009; Wójcik 2011) . In that respect, the challenges and constraints that we identify as preventing the widespread adoption of frontier finance serve to confirm the enduring forces of centralization that fortify the dominance of IFCs and the importance of agglomeration and scale economies in the market for global financial services (Kindelberger 1974; Conzen 1977) . We construct the argument as follows. In the next two sections we outline the map of large beneficiary institutions, or rather the functional and spatial structure of asset ownership and asset management, noting the prevalence external delegation. In section three we briefly unpack the frontier finance metaphor. In section four we provide a conceptual model of frontier places, as a means of clarifying the relationship between asset owners in such places and IFCs. Preceded by a section on methodology, the penultimate section reports and discusses our research findings on how frontier investors are trying to challenge convention through internal organizational change and external collaboration. The final section concludes.
Pension Fund Capitalism
In the twentieth century, the accumulation and pooling of wealth was a consequence of what could be described as pension fund capitalism (Clark 2000) ; primarily a developed-world phenomenon, AngloAmerican countries and others such as Finland, Switzerland, Japan, and the Netherlands made prefunded pensions, both public and private, important components of their respective pension systems. With successive pension reforms driving the growth of capitalized pension arrangements in other advanced economies (e.g. Germany) and the growth of pension savings in middle income economies, pension assets continue to grow in size and in geographic origin (Dixon 2008) .
At the end of 2011, global pension assets in the thirteen largest pension markets, accounting for 85 percent of all pension assets globally, stood at US$27,509 billion (TowersWatson 2012). To put the significance of this asset ownership in perspective, the worlds total equity market capitalization and total public debt securities were estimated to be US$54,000 billion and US$41,00 billion, respectively (Roxburgh, Lund, and Piotrowski 2011) . While collectively retirement-income organizations represent a major component of global financial markets, there are a number of institutions that, individually, control significant amounts of financial assets, which places them apart from smaller pools of capital in their ability to innovate as organizations and confront asymmetric power relationships in the investment management industry.
In Figure 1 , we show the largest retirement-income organizations with assets greater than US$25 billion at the end of 2011, using data from the P&I/Towers Watson World 300.
1 The majority shown are public employee pension plans, and thus government sponsored, that provide guaranteed income streams to their beneficiaries at retirement. There are, however, a number of single-employer corporate sponsored pension funds and multiemployer industry funds. The latter are common in the Netherlands and other continental European countries. Many of the single-employer funds are associated with former stateowned enterprises and/or monopoly utilities, such as the BT Group and the Electricity Supply Pension in the United Kingdom, or legacy manufacturing firms, such as General Motors and Ford, in the United States. The General Motors pension fund, for example, is a separate asset management company located in New York City. Included also are large pension reserve funds such as the French Fonds de réserve pour la retraite and the Australian Future Fund, the latter of which was formed to cover the government's liabilities for promised public sector pensions. Where there is a concentration of funds in a particular region, labels are not provided or only the largest fund is labeled (e.g. metropolitan Tokyo).
1 In the P&I/Towers Watson World 300 the Norwegian GPF-G is included as a pension fund. While the government changed the name from petroleum fund to pension fund, and has stated that the fund will cover pension liabilities, the GPF-G far outweighs any future pension liabilities. Hence, we include the GPF-G in figure 2 as a SWF. We also include the Alberta Investment Management Company (AIMCo) in figure 1, even though it also manages the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund, which is also included in figure 2. The majority of AIMCo funds under management come from public pension funds in Alberta. As expected, large funds are mainly present in countries with a long history of prefunded occupational pensions. In Europe, the largest pension funds are in the Netherlands and Denmark. In North America, large pension funds are located in major population centers of the U.S. Northeast and Midwest, metropolitan Ontario, California, and a number of large public employee funds in places such as Florida, Texas, and the Pacific Northwest. The largest pension fund in the world is the Government Pension Investment Fund of Japan, which manages roughly US$1.4 trillion in reserve funds of the Employees' Pension Insurance and the National Pension. There are also a number of other large pension funds headquartered in Tokyo, such as the Local Government Officials pension fund and the Pension Fund Association, which is a multiemployer pension fund. Elsewhere in the Asia region are the large provident funds of Singapore and Malaysia, and notably, the National Pension Service of Korea, which has just over US$300 billion in assets under management.
In using a cutoff of US$25 billion in order to simplify the map and highlight the largest pension funds, this excludes, problematically, a large number of smaller public sector pension funds across the United States and more importantly the concentration (and therefore the visual overlap) of smaller pension funds in particular cities. As a result, some of the largest pension fund markets in terms of assets to GDP that we have not already mentioned are understated. For example, with compulsory pension savings in Chile there is a large asset management industry in Santiago. This is likewise the case for Australia where compulsory superannuation, as pension savings there is known, feeds a large fund management industry centered chiefly in Sydney and Melbourne.
Although the spatial structure of large retirement-income organizations is dispersed, albeit across predominantly high income industrialized countries, it is important to emphasize that for the majority of these organizations asset management is delegated to for-profit private sector asset managers, most of whom are located in major international or regional financial centers. Two factors drive this. First, local markets are too small and provide limited opportunities for diversification. The local market can be defined as the national economy, as in the case of the Netherlands or Australia, where the ratio of pension assets to GDP in 2012 was 138 and 92 percent respectively 2 , or a regional economy, as in the case of Colorado Public Employees Retirement Association. Second, many funds are located in areas where the local market for specialized financial services is limited. We come back to the significance of this later in the article. The main task of the pension plan board of directors is, in most cases, deciding on asset allocation based on risk-return targets and the selection of external asset managers (usually with the help of external pension consultants). Mandates are either given to a range of different managers depending on asset class (extensive delegation), or to a smaller set of asset managers (intensive delegation) (Clark 2000) . In either case, contractual arrangements vary over time but are generally contingent on short-term performance metrics, such as exceeding a particular market benchmark (e.g. the S&P 500).
Few retirement-income organizations manage assets internally. Where organizations do manage some of their assets internally, they are most likely to manage highly rated fixed-income securities, such as U.S. Treasuries, or large-cap blue chip equities. In either of these cases, the decision to manage assets internally is contingent on whether there is sufficient scale to do so. Yet, what is sufficient scale is an empirical issue. The reason for using a cutoff of US$25 billion is that, in our experience, the pension funds that even consider bringing asset management back into the organization generally have assets in excess of this amount. In any case, pension funds that manage assets internally are still outliers. But, this is changing.
Sovereign Fund Capitalism
If pension fund capitalism characterized wealth accumulation and capital pooling in the second half of the twentieth century, nowadays we see increasing accumulation and pooling of wealth by additional means, and in a larger set of countries and regions. Notwithstanding the oil price shocks of the 1970s, commodity prices in general over the last decade reached historic highs, driven by rapid economic growth particularly in Asia and other emerging market economies, and by an insatiable thirst for commodities in the rich world. For those controlling the rents from these resources, whether public or private, the last decade has been a period of massive wealth accumulation, which does not appear to be subsiding anytime soon. Another source of wealth accumulation has come from current account imbalances in the global economy (Alberola and Serena 2008) . Deficit countries, particularly the United States, have amassed significant liabilities vis-à-vis surplus countries-namely China.
While much of the wealth accumulation from commodity production or the rebalancing of global economic activity has accrued to private hands, a large portion of it has accrued to those governments that control commodity rents, the central banks that accumulate massive foreign exchange reserves, and governments that maintain consistently strong budget surpluses (Aizenman and Glick 2009). To be sure, commodity exporters such as Saudi Arabia or export-led entrept economies such as Singapore have been accumulating wealth in these ways for decades, and have piled it directly back into global markets (and their own) (Yeung 2011 ). Yet in the last decade, the growth in wealth accruing to states (or states hoarding wealth) has become a larger phenomenon, reaching more and more countries, and specifically emerging and developing economies. If the current form of global capitalism is one marked by financialization, the rapid growth of government-owned investment funds, suggests recognition on the part of states of a world that favors holders of financial assets (Dore 2008; Clark, Dixon, and Monk 2013) . As such, SWFs are a mechanism by which the state can directly access global financial markets, thus providing the state a certain, if relative, financial clout in the international political economy. What is interesting about this current phase of state wealth accrual is that some states are establishing distinct institutional investment organizations charged with managing and investing the country's accumulated wealth in financial markets, as distinct from an entry in the treasurys or central bank's balance sheet. In that respect, some are given organizational latitude in executing a mandate set by the government as an independent financial institution. The more sophisticated organizations, such as Singapore's Government Investment Corporation, appear to compete, at least in terms of long-term performance, with the worlds largest and most competitive asset managers. Like other large beneficiary asset owners, however, most SWFs delegate asset management to for-profit asset management providers in the worlds largest IFCs or large regional financial centers. Again, this is largely a function of either the local economy being too small and limited in terms of diversification and/or the lack of local asset management capabilities.
The implication of the predominance of the delegation model by large beneficiary institutions is that responsibility for putting funds to work in the market is left to external private agents. In effect, just as a principal-agent relationship exists between the asset owner and the managers of firms, an issue of corporate governance, there is an overarching principal-agent relationship between the asset owner and the asset managers. And, as with any principal-agent relationship, the interests between the two parties are not always symmetrical (Eisenhardt 1989). As implied above, asset owners may use a range of incentives to manage principal-agent conflicts, which largely come in the form of contracts whose continuation is contingent on surplus performance against predetermined benchmarks. Portfolio managers are, however, quite adept at gaming institutional investors on performance fees. Separating out skilled managers from unskilled managers is impossible with current compensation mechanisms; instituting clawback provisions or postponing bonuses is likewise ineffective (see, Foster and Young 2010) . Accordingly, fees paid by asset owners are often excessive.
While individual agency dilemmas exist between individual asset owners and asset managers, it is important, then, to consider that the potential for asymmetrical information and misaligned interests between the wider organizational fields of asset owners (i.e. the beneficiary institutions described here) and for-profit portfolio managers is c Adam D. Dixon and Ashby H.B. Monk 2013 driven in part by the power resources (e.g., access to specialized labor, complementary services, time-sensitive information flows) that financial services providers obtain as a function of concentrating in financial centers (Wrigley, Currah, and Wood 2003; Beaverstock and Hall 2012; Wjcik 2012) . Put slightly differently, as the capacity to absorb and leverage market making activity and the benefits of agglomeration is stronger for those organizations located within financial centers, an asymmetric power relationship is produced between those organizations outside of the financial center. This would imply the existence of monopoly privileges for those agents within IFCs, which complicates interest alignment for asset owners located outside IFCs, while making rent extraction possible for for-profit portfolio managers acting within.
On the Frontiers of Finance
In order to explicate further the functional and spatial structure of the investment management industry at the global scale, we provide a conceptual model for unpacking the locational conditions of frontier investors and their relationship to IFCs, which for practical purposes is shorthand for global financial markets. But first, we must briefly clarify our usage of the frontier metaphor, as its application is potentially very broad.
In a figurative sense, frontier designates the separation between two different thingsconventional vs. non-conventional behavior, for example. For an organization, being on the frontier suggests an organization that breaks with convention and normal practice, or simply an innovating organization. Frontier can also mean the limits of knowledge in a particular subject, or a new area of exploration, exploitation, and development-the frontiers of science and technology, for instance. Applying frontier in the figurative sense to financial institutions, any number of organizations fall into this category, such as hedge funds which by definition are supposed to be applying innovative and nonconventional techniques and strategies. It could also apply to innovations in financial products, such as derivatives and securitization. But as the financial crisis has put such product and organizational innovation in a negative light (Ertürk, Leaver, and Williams 2010; French and Leyshon 2010) , we must caution against such a selective reading of the frontier. While we would not necessarily exclude such products and organizations as being frontiers of finance, this is not our use of the frontier metaphor. Our usage of frontier in the figurative sense stops with significance of breaking with convention and the exploration of new possibilities.
Our treatment of the frontier metaphor is also geographical. In this sense, frontier signifies a line of demarcation between two areas-the border between two countries, or the border between two regions, for example. Frontier can also denote the territory at the margin of settled and more developed regions. In that respect, frontier suggests the existence of a core and its periphery. But a frontier is different from a boundary. As Kristof (1959, 271-272) Kristof (1959, 273) further states that the frontier is, "an integrating factor. Being a zone of transition from the sphere (ecumene) of one way of life to another, and representing forces which are neither fully assimilated to nor satisfied with either, it provides an excellent opportunity for mutual interpenetration and sway. Along the frontier life constantly manipulates the settled patterns of the pivotally organized socio-political and cultural structures." Like the figurative qualities of the frontier, this geographical reading animates the frontier as a place of experimentation (and even lawlessness) where settled patterns of the center are challenged and/or manipulated.
Two points are in order to clarify our geographical usage of frontier. On the one hand, our interest is in specific financial institutions located outside financial centers that are engaged in the aforementioned behavior. This does not mean that all financial institutions by virtue of their location outside of major financial centers are engaged in such active experimentation. They are not all frontier investors. As the last two sections indicated, most beneficiary institutions hardly challenge convention, and thus the core. On the other hand, our treatment of frontier is not meant as an exclusive zone of investment. Although not excluding the possibility of local investment, we are interested in financial institutions whose investment remit is global. Moreover, frontier is not exclusive to either developed or developing economies and regions. This means that frontier investors, at least those from developing economies, may very well be focusing their investments in and around the core. But even if the world's major financial centers are located in developed economies, this does not mean that developed economies are devoid of frontier areas. Our model clarifies these points further.
Modeling the Frontier
For any knowledge and informationintensive business, of which financial services is included, effective and specialized labor is a key factor in firm success and survival. Ensuring access to a large and stable supply of specialized labor is one reason why competing firms in an industry tend to locate in clusters in urban and regional agglomerations. Search and match costs are lower for firms, and, importantly, the presence of competing employers, which drives up remuneration levels, incentivizes employees to invest in skills upgrading and specialization, whether through further education or by switching between competing firms (which also produces knowledge spillovers). In locating in a major IFC, financial workers have a wider variety of firms for which they can work or firms with sufficient scale (e.g. a global investment bank) such that a range of skills can be acquired. As such, workers can develop an extensive skill set, such as through working for a buy-side and a sell-side firm, or an intensive skill set, such as through focusing a career path on a specific investment activity (e.g. commercial real estate).
Just as the labor market is important to financial services firms, so is access to a wide variety of intermediate service providers, ranging from accounting, audit, and legal services, to specialist research firms and investment consultants. If there is a premium on time, financial services firms locating near these intermediate inputs can ensure timely and reliable service. And, as the intermediate producer services market is likely to be competitive, financial services firms may exact better prices. More importantly, these producer services will have the same labor market characteristics as described above that promote specialization and skills upgrading, thereby reinforcing agglomeration and the attractiveness of the financial center as a place to conduct business. Hence, the y-variable in our model, which is visualized in Figure 3 , is city-size and specialization. Accordingly, we assume that on average larger cities have, or have the capacity to produce, a critical mass of financial and related intermediate services in support of large-scale asset management, while also being at an advantage in the recruitment and retention of highly skilled and specialized knowledge workers. Note, however, that city-size and specialization do not necessarily increase together in the same direction. Although we assume that on average larger cities have the capacity to specialize and diversify into related services, that does not mean that larger cities are by default more specialized than smaller cities.
Acting to reinforce the hierarchical pattern and the concentration of financial activity in large IFCs in particular is the risk management function of finance. For investors large and small, portfolio diversification is an important component of risk management. Risk conscious investors thus tend to seek a range of financial products and geographic markets, which usually only large financial centers are able to provide, as a means of minimizing idiosyncratic risk, or rather the adverse consequences a loss on any one investment has on the portfolio as a whole. This process is reinforced by the issuers of securities and other financial services who are equally attracted to large financial centers due to the demand generated by the large number of potential investors. At the same time, the geographical concentration of a large number of potential investors helps reduce liquidity risk, which is the speed and ability of an investor to convert an asset to cash, as they are brought together in the secondary market. In theory, deeper markets make it easier for firms and governments to raise capital while driving down the aggregate cost of capital.
We define our x-variable, then, as distance and access to global finance. This variable is meant to capture the size and extent of the local market-assuming that for some places the local market is closer to, and/or part of, the global market, and therefore the transaction costs associated with accessing global markets. Like the yvariable, distance and access do not necessarily increase and move in the same direction. A city, such as one in Australia or New Zealand, may be geographically very far from the core centers of global finance and even the core developed economies, but still cognitively, organizationally, socially, and institutionally proximate (see , Boschma 2005; Boschma and Frenken 2010) .
To clarify the logic of the model, we subsequently divide the model into quadrants A, B, C, and D. Quadrants A, C, and D are checkered, as they represent frontier places. Quadrant B represents those places that are at the forefront in terms of market size and specialization, making them centers of global finance. We should note that our model does not consider off-shore tax havens where little actual management of assets takes place (Roberts 1995) . Furthermore, our model should not be seen as a replacement for more conventional city-rankings of financial services activity and interconnectedness (see, e.g, Wójcik 2007) . Rather, the model we present here should be seen as a conceptual typology that allows us to consider the organizational constraints facing frontier beneficiary institutions in managing and allocating capital. We clarify our model by way of specific examples, which we derive from our research and our wider understanding of the hierarchy of financial centers. The examples below are by no means exhaustive.
A-Large Frontier Cities
In quadrant A we can locate large cities on the periphery of global finance that may be significant regional financial centers, but are geographically distant or distant along some other dimension (e.g. cognitive distance). Likewise, local investment opportunities (i.e. the market) may be limited in size and scope and thus the opportunities for diversification. An example of such a city is Melbourne, Australia, which, as mentioned earlier, is a hub of investment management for the Australian superannuation industry. But, Melbourne is not the center for Australian capital markets, which is Sydney. Melbourne is a relatively large city with over 4 million people, and given the size of the funds management industry there, the city is relatively developed in terms of the labor market for financial services, as is its cognitive and institutionally proximity with the large Western IFCs. But, given Melbourne's geographic location, it is arguably more difficult to reproduce social and organizational proximity with actors in the major IFCs, thus complicating principal-agent relationships. The place of Melbourne also has to be considered in terms of the size and diversity of the Australian economy, which is insufficiently large to absorb the growth of compulsory pension savings. Going global is therefore a necessity for the Australian superannuation industry. Taking these factors together, Melbourne would sit in the lower right quadrant of quadrant A.
Other cities in quadrant A could be the mainland Chinese cities Beijing and Shanghai. Although Shanghai is slightly larger than Beijing, its place as the leading financial center in mainland China places it higher than and to the right of the latter. But, in both cases, and notwithstanding the size of the Chinese economy and its close (geographical and social) proximity with Hong Kong and Singapore (Lai 2011 (Lai , 2012 , capital controls and the limited convertibility of the renminbi are, for example, regulatory-cum-institutional constraints limiting their proximity to global markets.
B-Centers of Global Finance
In quadrant B are included the major international financial centers in terms of market size and specialization, as one normally sees in global financial center rankings.
3 In the top right of the quadrant would sit New York, London, and Hong Kong. These three places house the headquarters of major international banks and investment services providers; they are the primary locations where large public companies are listed and traded; and they are the primary location investors come to access a wide variety of investment products. Elsewhere in quadrant B we can include Tokyo, given the size of the Japanese economy. Yet, Tokyo has receded as an international financial center, which means it is far to the left of the above three, and arguably in the bottom left quadrant of quadrant B. Singapore, in contrast, would sit to the right of Tokyo, but it is normally not considered as significant as the three premier centers.
C-Small Cities on the Distant Frontier
In this quadrant sit those cities where the local labor and services market is highly limited in terms of specialization and where the transaction costs for accessing global financial markets are high due to either physical distance, or, for example, distance created by some other political-cum-institutional constraint (e.g. political unrest).
4 These 3 See, for example, the bi-annual index of global financial centers produced by the commercial thinktank Z/Yen Group. 4 We are not suggesting here that investors in low income economies, particularly SWFs, should access global finance, due to the scarcity of local capital. There is a case for commodity-based SWFs, are also places where the size of the domestic economy is limited and where the local financial system remains underdeveloped. Here would be included cities in low-to-middle income economies, such as Gaborone, Botswana or Dili, Timor-Leste, both of which are home to commodity-based SWFs. Also included would be cities in central Asia such as Astana and Almaty in Khazakstan; or, cities close to major markets such as Tripoli, Libya and Algiers, Algeria, which although close in distance to the European market, are still likely to have constraints in terms of transactions costs and limited access locally to specialized services.
D-Small Cities on the Frontier
In quandrant D are those cities that by virtue of their location within larger markets have more access to global finance than cities in quadrant C. They are also relatively more likely to be cognitively, organizationally, socially, and institutionally proximate. Nonetheless, these cities may still have limits in terms of local labor markets, expertise, and specialization. For example, Edmonton, Alberta, where AIMCo is headquartered, would be included in quadrant D, given the size and scope of the North American market. But given the physical location of Edmonton and the size of the city, the scope of local expertise and specialization is limited. Edmonton is not the preferred working location for Canada's financial talent. This would mean it sits to the left of the quadrant.
however, to hold highly liquid securities (e.g. U.S. Treasuries) to create a buffer against falling commodity prices. Holding international securities is also a means of mitigating Dutch Disease effects from commodity revenues.
Another example is Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, which is headquarters to two large public pension funds. Although Harrisburg is closer to New York in terms of distance, it is a small city with limited recourse to financial expertise. We would also include a city such as Abu Dhabi in this quadrant, given the Gulf States region has been growing in terms of its international linkages for all sorts of global economic activity and the proximity this brings, not least due to the massive accumulation of commodity wealth and the spending power this provides governments in attracting such activity. Given the limited size of the local market, however, it would be placed on the far left; and given the limited scope and specialization of local financial services capabilities, it would sit in the bottom half of the quadrant. In the top right corner of quadrant D would also be included cities like Sacramento, California, home to two of the largest pension funds in the United States, or the greater Randstad metropolitan area in the Netherlands, where most large Dutch pension funds are located. Both of these examples are places where financial expertise and services are more developed or where local opportunities (e.g. Silicon Valley venture capital in the case of Sacramento) are wider. Nonetheless, given their place outside of a major global financial center-and the cognitive, organizational, and social distance this may entail-they still face agency issues when dealing with agents operating in global financial centers.
Methodology
Adopting an approach grounded in 'close dialogue' (Clark 1998; Lowe and Wrigley 2010) , our insights are drawn from 75 semistructured interviews and more than 150 informal conversations gained through attendance at a range of industry-focused conferences and closed-door roundtable discussions of sovereign and pension funds trying to overcome the constraints of locating outside of a major IFC. The beneficiary institutions that participated in our research represent approximately US$3 trillion in assets under management. The smallest organizations have assets of around US$20 billion, while the largest tops out at over half a trillion dollars. Our sample includes institutions from North America, East Asia, Western Europe, Australasia, Africa and the Middle East. All of the organizations consulted would figure in quadrants A and D in the above model. As such, our sample represents a significant cross section of major beneficiary institutions in frontier places, save for Latin America. Respondents at the organizations in our sample were the senior executives charged with investment decision making (i.e. chief investment officer, or deputy) and/or operations (i.e. chief operations officer, or deputy). We maintain complete anonymity for our respondents, choosing likewise not to use direct quotes in our analysis but rather to reveal issues in a general sense.
For many of our respondents, access is afforded only to those individuals that can establish trust, which often only occurs in mutually beneficial and repetitive working environments. As a result, we have played, in some but not all instances, a dual role as academic and discussion facilitator and participant at private closed-door industry conferences and roundtables. In that sense our research is participatory (Kindon, Pain, and Kesby 2007) . There is a quid pro quo wherein there is an exchange of insight and knowledge between the researcher and the subject organizations. Put slightly differently, in gaining insight from our subjects, our knowledge as economic geographers and our positionality as outsiders is of interest to the subject organizations and practitioners, as they seek to better understand and clarify the issues or problems they face. We recognize, however, the risk of co-option and seduction that this research strategy may engender, particularly as recurrent interaction compromises the insider/outsider divide (Rose 1997; Herod 1999) .
But driving our engaged scholarship (Van de Ven 2007) , is the fact that many of these investors are difficult to access and gather information on. This is particularly relevant in the case of SWFs originating in countries not subject to democratic forms of government and transparency. For these organizations, their operations and investments are politically (and economically) sensitive, even if the underlying intent of the investment mandate is explicitly apolitical. Even in the case of public pension funds from liberal democracies, there are operational issues that are likely to be politically sensitive. Exposing inefficiencies or even incompetence has real consequences for management teams.
Despite problems such close engagement and shifting positionality poses for objectivity (Schoenberger 1991) , we have conditioned our insight throughout the research process and the analysis herein on complementary research in other or similar academic settings. More importantly, the developments presented and analyzed below are increasingly discussed in industry publications, as well as in annual reports and other publications produced by many of the organizations themselves. In effect, while problems with access may pose challenges for replication, there are increasing amounts of public evidence available to support corroboration. And although we still consider our findings significant, we do not at this stage make generalized claims. In this respect, the research presented here follows patterns of reflexive science as opposed to positive science (Burawoy 1998) . Additional systematic research in a positive frame is thus warranted to provide further empirical confirmation of our observations and the validity of our interpretations.
A Locational Opportunity to Remake Finance?
What sets frontier investors apart from generic investors on the peripheries of global finance is the intent among the former to insource more of their investment operations in place of relying on external asset managers. In this regard, the growing community of frontier investors is attempting to reduce the agency problems present in the functional and spatial structure of the investment management industry. While many of our respondents viewed that a functional and spatial reorganization of institutional investment is one way of realigning interests in the favor of beneficiaries (and potentially the recipients of capital), they also acknowledged the profound organizational and governance challenges associated with frontier finance.
Replicating the external market for financial services within a single institutional investor brings up significant issues related to scale and expertise. Only the very largest beneficiary institutions are perhaps financially capable of enveloping some (and still not all) traditionally outsourced functions and investment mandates necessary to ensure a well-diversified global portfolio that provides a risk-adjusted return that meets the needs of their beneficiaries. But with increasing size and complexity come issues of organizational inertia. Without market rivalry and competition for such services, or a limited scope for inter-organizational knowledge transfers and spillovers, there is a risk of organizational sclerosis. Coupled with the challenge of how to govern effectively a range of functions, bringing more of the market within the organization is pregnant with risks. Hence, there are robust organizational reasons why most beneficiary institutions continue to delegate through contract the management of assets to service providers in major IFCs or larger regional centers.
Insourcing asset management comes with a variety of challenges, such as attracting and retaining adequate human resources, achieving the necessary scale of in-house capabilities to be able to build a diversified portfolio, and overcoming the loss of scale economies realized in their relationships with intermediaries in IFCs. All of these are profound challenges cited by our respondents. Nevertheless, recognizing that frontier finance still offers a legitimate opportunity to remake some of the geographical dimensions of global finance and financial practice, our respondents outlined these organizational challenges and offered potential solutions (or, put slightly differently, strategies for coping with their locational constraints). In the subsections below we describe the three most often cited constraints and solutions.
Redefining Financial Talent
The difficulty for many beneficiary institutions located in peripheral places executing innovative or in-house investment mandates is attracting the specialized labor necessary to do so. In the first instance, many beneficiary institutions are treated as public agencies, which normally limits their abilityoften for political reasons-to match privatesector remuneration levels (Boyne, Poole, and Jenkins 1999) . So long as these frontier investors do not pay the market median for finance sector jobs, they will be a second order option for the "Wall Street" labor pool (Bertram and Zvan 2009; Ambachtsheer 2011; Wójcik 2012) ; and, it is unlikely that buy-in from policymakers (and the wider public) for comparable compensation with the private sector will be obtained.
Compounding this problem is how to align the interests of staff with the interests of the organization, given that most beneficiary institutions have intergenerational time horizons, while the for-profit asset management industry for the most part does not. This principal-agent problem makes hiring and motivating talent to act in the best interests of the fund difficult. In the second instance, while hiring talent can be a challenge in any location, it is made more difficult for those beneficiary institutions located in small cities with a limited labor pool (i.e., all investors located in quadrants C and some in quadrant D of our model). Yet, there are some innovative workarounds separate from the seemingly simple solution of matching private sector remuneration and benefits. Simply put, extra-financial considerations are being exploited more explicitly in recruitment and retention practices. Part of this is through targeting specific types of employ-ees, which can be categorized conceptually as green, grey, and grounded.
Frontier investors appear quite competitive in attracting young (i.e., green) talent. At this early stage, the disparity between public sector and private sector salaries is the lowest. Moreover, the opportunities for career development at a large beneficiary institution can be (in many cases) far superior to those in the private sector. To this end, frontier investors recognize the importance of ongoing skills development and acquisition through internal training programs, which is part of wider efforts to foster organizational learning. But more significantly, given that many of these organizations still have limited human resource budgets and/or limited numbers of specialists, younger employees are exposed more readily to different activities of the fund and deal-making, such that they receive valuable on-the-job training not necessarily afforded to their private-sector counterparts.
While attracting young talent is less problematic from a purely financial perspective, this is not the case when attracting older and more experienced employees-those individuals that have had successful careers in major financial institutions in major financial centers. Contrary to expectations, a number of our respondents seem competitive in the competition for older (i.e., grey) employees. There are two key reasons driving this. First, these employees normally have significant accumulated wealth through previous work and are now interested in escaping the strenuous fast-pace conditions present in the private sector and a major IFC. While many of our respondents aim to compete with comparable forprofit asset managers, working conditions and expectations are not as strenuous. Second, the up-or-out employment contracts used by many large private financial institutions produces a large amount of skilled and experienced financial professionals that have many working years left.
Frontier investors are also competitive at hiring people that are tied to or attracted to the region (i.e., grounded) due to family, identity, or personal affinity. Indeed, many of our respondents at beneficiary institutions are there because they want to stay close to relatives, give back to their country or community, or just be close to some particular lifestyle attraction (e.g. skiing or hiking) that is not readily available in a highly urbanized financial center. This is where frontier investors are most able to hire the mid-career professionals who can earn high salaries in the private sector. At the same time, such lifestyle considerations are also deemed helpful in attracting early and later-career professionals.
By rethinking the ideal type of employee in these ways and using geography as an advantage rather than a disadvantage, frontier investors are addressing the principalagent challenge of effectively aligning over a longer time horizon the interests of the asset owners with the asset managers. If beneficiary institutions have intergenerational time horizons, the people that manage their assets may not, or at least they may be more prone to short-termism and myopic thinking. While remuneration still looms large, frontier investors, ultimately, are trying to appeal to ones extra-financial affinities to derive a long-term commitment and dedication to the long-term mission of the organization.
From Diversified to Concentrated Portfolios
In diversifying widely the investment portfolio, most beneficiary institutions rely on external mandates, as the scope for doing so internally is large. Managing different asset classes in-house (or different investment strategies) requires the creation of distinct teams of portfolio managers that cover specific domains (e.g. European equities; Asian Equities; fixed-income; alternatives). But the emphasis on widely diversified portfolios is losing significance. While criticism existed before the financial crisis, many conventional investment beliefs, such as the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, and the conventional asset allocation methods, namely Modern Portfolio Theory, have come into question (Fox 2009; Ormerod 2010 ).
The crisis demonstrated that few institutional investors (despite following the precepts of the latter) actually knew their risk exposures. Diversification across asset classes failed to provide the risk minimization that many thought it did (or would). Notwithstanding the impossibility of mitigating systemic risk through diversification, frontier investors are taking more care in considering potential systemic risks (e.g. climate change), while also looking to minimize idiosyncratic risks by rethinking conventional asset allocation strategies. Accordingly, frontier investors, those seriously considering and experimenting with insourcing, are exploring and/or are moving to more concentrated portfolios rather than holding a broadly diversified portfolio following the precepts of Modern Portfolio Theory.
If financial models of market data and corporate accounting undoubtedly have their place, but they are not seen as the refuge they once were (Hall 2006) . Instead of relying exclusively on all kinds of quantitative data, frontier investors are going into the field to tangibly engage with potential investment projects and investees, which concentrated portfolios facilitates by freeing up time and resources. In this respect, the shift to concentrated portfolios has coincided with a growth of and growing interest in direct investments, which require more significant monitoring and due diligence but provide access to assets with lower fees and higher alignment of interests.
If broad and passive portfolios are best served by intermediation in the large IFCs where most shares and fixed-income instruments are issued, this is not necessarily the case for smaller portfolios and direct investing. Hence, a smaller more focused portfolio allows frontier investors the possibility of bypassing large IFCs, and, in the process, for-profit services providers and intermediaries. Notwithstanding the growing interest and experimentation in this regard, the shift away from conventional diversification strategies of holding broad swaths of the market is incomplete. If the organizational hurdles of building internal teams and finding adequate expertise are high, frontier investors, by virtue of the size of assets under management, require equivalently large investment opportunities. At issue is how to place all of the assets under management, as direct investment opportunities are insufficiently large. Consequently, being without the market is an improbable proposition for even the most sophisticated frontier investor. Portfolio concentration has its limits. This does not mean that frontier investors must necessarily rely on external portfolio managers. With size comes more internal resources available to construct internal teams, even if those teams operate in a manner equivalent to external portfolio managers.
Building Decentralized Capabilities and Global Partnerships
One way large beneficiary institutions can overcome the constraints of location is to set up an office in a major IFC such as New York, London, or Hong Kong, and, in effect, tap into the local labor market and local information flows. While actually reinforcing the dominance of major financial centers, this coping strategy is not without significant hurdles. For example, a public pension or sovereign fund is rarely an employer of choice in a financial center for the simple reason that these organizations often fail to meet private sector compensation levels.
More disruptive to the IFC hierarchy is the growth of collaboration and coinvestment. Frontier investors are increasingly sharing expertise, local knowledge, and information on deal flows in the form of loosely affiliated strategic alliances. At an intermediate level, frontier investors are establishing more formal alliances with a dedicated administrator that ensures active input on the part of the members, while minimizing free riding. At the most advanced level, frontier investors are coming together and establishing jointly-owned asset management companies that focus on particular strategies or sectors. In all cases, frontier investors are building cognitive and social proximity as a type of investor. At the more advanced levels of collaboration, they are building organizational proximity (Boschma 2005) .
Arguably, peer-to-peer collaboration is necessary to make insourcing and direct investing feasible; the scale and scope necessary to mimic functions provided by the market for financial services is difficult to recreate. In addition to the organizational learning effects of collaboration, working together facilitates local understanding of distant markets, which has been shown to improve investment returns (Coval and Moskowitz 2001 ). This in turn can lead to higher returns over the long term thanks to information obtained by local actors, particularly in asset classes in which there are considerable informational asymmetries. In certain jurisdictions and industries, gaining access to the best assets requires having a local partner to mute headline risk, which is the risk that a news story will adversely affect a companys share price, and political risk. In other words, the local partner is filtering institutional differences for the benefit of the external partners, resulting in more attractive deal flows and better terms.
At the same time, collaboration allows for greater economies of scale, which brings competitive advantages in financial markets and matters greatly for doing direct deals, given the costs of due diligence and other matters. Moreover, working together allows frontier investors to reap the benefits of scale while also keeping a diversified portfolio. By collaborating, frontier investors are, in effect, taking advantage of informational externalities produced through network linkages (Johansson and Quigley 2004) . In other words, they are replacing the lost benefits of not locating in or contracting services from providers in large urban agglomerations-in this case large IFCs. In effect, frontier investors are attempting to build virtual agglomerations (Bathelt, Malmberg, and Maskell 2004; Bathelt and Glückler 2011) . Ultimately, then, by bringing together two or three frontier investors with diverse backgrounds from different geographical locations into a cooperative arrangement, the effectiveness of the investment function in a specific economic geography and across different geographies is maximized. They fill gaps in each others internal capabilities.
While collaboration and network effects offer a potential avenue to bypass IFCs, we must also acknowledge some of the legitimate challenges and coordination costs that have emerged from our research. If loosely affiliated alliances for information exchange are easy to establish and manage, more advanced forms of collaboration and co-investment remain ad-hoc and infrequent. There are obvious agency issues to be considered in the design and governance arrangements, because of the asymmetric information among the collaborators. Attempts at formalizing collaboration such as memoranda of understanding or even formal organizational structures to facilitate collaborative investing (with allocated assets and joint-investment committees), as respondents indicated, have proved difficult to establish. Most sovereign funds and public pension funds face bureaucratic and/or political constraints, which mean it can be extremely difficult to get internal approvals to launch a vehicle where one fund relies on the investment advice of another fund. The barriers are not simply organizational and geographical, or a question of sufficient asset-specific investments; there are legal constraints that require modification. There are thus persistence problems from institutional and organizational distance.
Search and match costs relating to finding collaborators with comparable worldviews are also a constraint. Institutional investors with comparable investment beliefs will be more apt to collaborate than those that see markets and the world for that matter in different ways. While a shared epistemology is important, it does not appear all that important that they act in exactly the same way. Again, different local knowledge sets and skills complement each frontier investors capabilities. But, it is important that they agree in the way assets should be deployed in a given domain. Cognitive proximity is a necessary element that is not always present. The problem is that it can be very challenging to identify the reasoning and motives underpinning another organizations actions and behavior, making attempts to find partners exigent. It is uncertain at this juncture whether the increasing social proximity brought through loosely affiliated alliances will bring cognitive convergence.
Conclusions
At the beginning of this article we posed the question as to whether the organizationalcum-geographical change of large beneficiary institutions located in places beyond the hinterlands of global financial centers, which we call frontier investors, represent a window of locational opportunity to remake the map of the investment management industry and, in turn, undermine the dominance of large IFCs in the allocation capital across time and space. Based on our initial study, and considering the significant size of these organizations in terms of assets under management, the scope for challenging the status quo to effect a realignment of the interests and outcomes between asset owners (and therefore beneficiaries) and the financial services industry is compelling. Yet, as our engagement with frontier investors and our analysis indicates, there are still a number of constraints that must be overcome and solved if the status quo and the dominance of major IFCs and the service providers therein are to be altered significantly. Likewise, where there is progress, there is insufficient critical mass to suggest a paradigmatic shift in the geography of finance. This does not mean, notwithstanding, that progress at the level of individual organizations is insignificant.
It is unsurprising that the global financial crisis, despite offering what looked like a window of opportunity to redefine the financial services industry and its locational characteristics, has not resulted in any meaningful change. In spite of mass protests and rhetorical gestures from the political classes, the crisis simply reinforced the consolidation and concentration in the financial services industry that had been underway during the previous two decades. Commercial and investment banks in particular have become larger, not smaller. In the global geography of finance the place of IFCs and the power of agents therein is unwavering. While consolidation and concentration is due partly to political and regulatory decisions, which are undoubtedly influenced by the industry's lobbying efforts, it is also a function of economies of scale, scope, and agglomeration. The enduring significance of these economic-geographical effects is borne out by experience of large beneficiary institutions. Frontier investors are developing some effective alternatives to overcome their organizational and geographical constraints, but it is uncertain if these alternatives will be adopted wholesale by other large beneficiary institutions, or whether they are simply part of an ephemeral experiment that will succumb eventually to organizational sclerosis and failure.
Even if the outlook for this organizational-cum-geographical experimentation is uncertain, the conceptual schema of frontier finance provides a useful means more generally of describing and explaining the global geography of finance and the place of different organizations and actors therein. Recourse to common analytical categories such as developed vs. emerging economy, or common geopolitical units of analysis such as the nation-state, is somewhat inadequate. Frontier captures the relationship between core regions and their peripheries, while also conveying a sense of lawlessness where convention is broken and reformed. It is a language of possibility.
